Models of Endogenous Coalition Formation Between Fiscal and Monetary Authorities in the Presence of a Monetary Union
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Publication:5013727
DOI10.1007/978-3-540-74684-3_5zbMath1477.91032OpenAlexW2126184366WikidataQ57787073 ScholiaQ57787073MaRDI QIDQ5013727
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Publication date: 2 December 2021
Published in: Advances in Computational Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74684-3_5
Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)
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Cites Work
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