On Stackelberg–Nash Equilibria in Bilevel Optimization Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-52119-6_2zbMath1479.91063OpenAlexW3107507524MaRDI QIDQ5014625

Olivier Musy, Ludovic A. Julien, Damien Bazin

Publication date: 8 December 2021

Published in: Bilevel Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52119-6_2

zbMATH Keywords

Stackelberg-Nash equilibriummultiple leader-follower game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Semi-infinite programming (90C34) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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