On Stackelberg–Nash Equilibria in Bilevel Optimization Games
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Publication:5014625
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-52119-6_2zbMath1479.91063OpenAlexW3107507524MaRDI QIDQ5014625
Olivier Musy, Ludovic A. Julien, Damien Bazin
Publication date: 8 December 2021
Published in: Bilevel Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-52119-6_2
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Semi-infinite programming (90C34) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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