On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: from discrete to continuous time
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Publication:501748
DOI10.3934/jdg.2017001zbMath1354.91018OpenAlexW3124166736MaRDI QIDQ501748
Mathias Staudigl, Jan-Henrik Steg
Publication date: 10 January 2017
Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2017001
Discrete-time games (91A50) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Random measures (60G57) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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