Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications

DOI10.3982/ECTA18312zbMath1480.91074OpenAlexW3186844096MaRDI QIDQ5020496

Benny Moldovanu, Philipp Strack, Andreas Kleiner

Publication date: 6 January 2022

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta18312

zbMATH Keywords

extreme pointsmechanism designmajorization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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