Replicator Dynamics and Weak Pay-Off Positive Selection Dynamics: An Overview

DOI10.1007/978-981-16-4737-6_1zbMath1481.91028OpenAlexW4206126521MaRDI QIDQ5022145

Amarjyoti Mahanta

Publication date: 18 January 2022

Published in: Indian Statistical Institute Series (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4737-6_1

zbMATH Keywords

limit cyclesdynamical systemsreplicator dynamicsweak pay-off positive dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Evolutionary Games in Economics
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary game dynamics

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