Assembly Problems
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Publication:5022151
DOI10.1007/978-981-16-4737-6_5zbMath1481.91086OpenAlexW4206449810MaRDI QIDQ5022151
Dhritiman Gupta, Soumendu Sarkar
Publication date: 18 January 2022
Published in: Indian Statistical Institute Series (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4737-6_5
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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