The Efficient, Symmetric and Linear Values for Cooperative Games and Their Characterizations

DOI10.1007/978-981-16-4737-6_7zbMath1481.91015OpenAlexW4206272178MaRDI QIDQ5022154

Surajit Borkotokey, Sujata Goala

Publication date: 18 January 2022

Published in: Indian Statistical Institute Series (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4737-6_7

zbMATH Keywords

characterizationsTU gamesegalitarian Shapley valueESL values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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