Self-enforcing Agreements and Forward Induction Reasoning

DOI10.1093/restud/rdaa051zbMath1481.91033OpenAlexW3080116135MaRDI QIDQ5022561

Emiliano Catonini

Publication date: 19 January 2022

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa051

zbMATH Keywords

extensive-form rationalizabilityforward inductionself-enforcing agreementsincomplete agreements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Related Items (6)

On non-monotonic strategic reasoning ⋮ Belief change, rationality, and strategic reasoning in sequential games ⋮ Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings ⋮ Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies ⋮ Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm ⋮ Transparent Restrictions on Beliefs and Forward-Induction Reasoning in Games with Asymmetric Information

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