Carbon Taxes and Climate Commitment with Non-constant Time Preference

DOI10.1093/restud/rdaa048zbMath1481.91140OpenAlexW2767459538MaRDI QIDQ5022570

Terrence Iverson, Larry S. Karp

Publication date: 19 January 2022

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3hw6s14v

zbMATH Keywords

hyperbolic discountingtime consistencyclimate policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (1)

Time-consistent equilibria in dynamic models with recursive payoffs and behavioral discounting

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