The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAA007zbMath1481.91088OpenAlexW1563411708MaRDI QIDQ5022572

Bradley J. Larsen

Publication date: 19 January 2022

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w20431.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencybargainingincomplete informationnegotiationMyerson-Satterthwaite theoremalternating offersbounds identificationempirical market design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Secret reserve prices by uninformed sellers ⋮ Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert ⋮ Prices versus auctions in large markets

This page was built for publication: The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions