Strong Nash equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities
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Publication:502326
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.11.001zbMath1395.91077OpenAlexW1699957596MaRDI QIDQ502326
Publication date: 4 January 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.11.001
strong Nash equilibriumcongestion gamecoalitional improvement pathgame with structured utilitiesweakest-link aggregation
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A universal construction generating potential games ⋮ Nash and Stackelberg equilibria in games with pay-off functions constructed by minimum convolutions of antagonistic and private criteria
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