Noisy signaling in discrete time

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2016.10.002zbMath1395.91223OpenAlexW2555085829MaRDI QIDQ502328

Francesc Dilmé

Publication date: 4 January 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.10.002

zbMATH Keywords

discrete timedynamic noisy signalingendogenous effort

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

Signaling covertly acquired information ⋮ Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling

Cites Work

• Market signaling with grades
• Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switched effort levels
• Dynamic signaling and market breakdown
• Repeated signaling games
• Information about sellers' past behavior in the market for lemons
• Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons
• Gambling Reputation: Repeated Bargaining With Outside Options
• Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
• Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons
• Equilibrium Limit Pricing: The Effects of Private Information and Stochastic Demand
• Search With Adverse Selection
• Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations

This page was built for publication: Noisy signaling in discrete time