Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.08.003zbMath1397.91257OpenAlexW2518700550MaRDI QIDQ502369

Dries Vermeulen, Marc Schröder, Janos Flesch

Publication date: 5 January 2017

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/72810614/flesch_2016_implementable_and_ex_post_IR.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining probleminterim-implementable trading rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Robust bilateral trade with discrete types ⋮ Collusion-proof and fair auctions

Cites Work

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• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
• Robust trading mechanisms
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• On incentive compatible, individually rational, and ex post efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Optimal Auction Design

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