Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games
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Publication:5026202
DOI10.1613/jair.1.12542OpenAlexW3210117135MaRDI QIDQ5026202
Alexandros Hollender, Georgios Birmpas, Ninad Rajgopal, Francisco J. Marmolejo-Cossío, Jiarui Gan, Alexandros A. Voudouris
Publication date: 7 February 2022
Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2006.06566
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