Robustly Optimal Auctions with Unknown Resale Opportunities

DOI10.1093/restud/rdy041OpenAlexW3125128899WikidataQ129481698 ScholiaQ129481698MaRDI QIDQ5028526

I. R. Segal', Gabriel D. Carroll

Publication date: 10 February 2022

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy041

zbMATH Keywords

worst caseauctions with resaleAusubel-Cramton-Vickrey (ACV) auctionduality in auction designnon-local incentive constraintsrobust revenue maximization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Robust incentives for information acquisition ⋮ Detectability, duality, and surplus extraction ⋮ How to sell in a sequential auction market ⋮ Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed ⋮ Robust Incentives for Teams

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