Mini-max incentive strategy for leader–follower games under uncertain dynamics
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Publication:5029142
DOI10.1080/00207721.2021.1922951zbMath1483.91052OpenAlexW3171854310MaRDI QIDQ5029142
Celeste Rodriguez-Carreon, Ignacio Quiroz-Vázquez, César Emilio Villarreal, Manuel Jimenez-Lizarraga
Publication date: 11 February 2022
Published in: International Journal of Systems Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207721.2021.1922951
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) 2-person games (91A05) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Hamilton-Jacobi equations in optimal control and differential games (49L12)
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