When does inferring reputation probability countervail temptation in cooperative behaviors for the prisoners' dilemma game?
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Publication:502956
DOI10.1016/j.chaos.2015.07.030zbMath1353.91007OpenAlexW1270407644WikidataQ106508733 ScholiaQ106508733MaRDI QIDQ502956
Publication date: 11 January 2017
Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2015.07.030
Related Items (6)
Reputation evaluation with tolerance and reputation-dependent imitation on cooperation in spatial public goods game ⋮ Combining evolutionary game theory and network theory to analyze human cooperation patterns ⋮ Impact of reputation-based switching strategy between punishment and social exclusion on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game ⋮ Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on signed networks based on structural balance theory ⋮ Prisoner's dilemma game on reputation-based weighted network ⋮ Structural effects of participation propensity in online collective actions: based on big data and Delphi methods
Cites Work
- Reputation-based mutual selection rule promotes cooperation in spatial threshold public goods games
- Promotion of cooperation induced by nonuniform payoff allocation in spatial public goods game
- Bounded rationality in volunteering public goods games
- Promotion of cooperation due to diversity of players in the spatial public goods game with increasing neighborhood size
- Dynamics of \(N\)-person snowdrift games in structured populations
- The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
- Does a tag system effectively support emerging cooperation?
- A theory of group selection.
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
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