Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.10.007zbMath1400.91182OpenAlexW3124801992MaRDI QIDQ503055

Yong-Cai Geng, Sumit K. Garg

Publication date: 11 January 2017

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22457.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

flexibilitydynamic efficiencybudget negotiationsdiscretionary spendingendogenous status quomandatory spendingsunset provision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (3)

BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH ⋮ Electoral competition with costly policy changes: a dynamic perspective ⋮ Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions

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