Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions

DOI10.1287/opre.2021.2104zbMath1484.91217arXiv1610.03564OpenAlexW3208935695MaRDI QIDQ5031009

No author found.

Publication date: 18 February 2022

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.03564

zbMATH Keywords

combinatorial auctionsponsored search auctionsVCG auctioncore pricingGSP auctionrevenue management and market analyticssale of ad space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

Uses Software

• LIPSOL
• QP

Cites Work

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• On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
• Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
• Package Auctions and Exchanges
• Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions

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