Core Pricing in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Buyers: Computational Hardness and Algorithmic Solutions

DOI10.1287/opre.2021.2132zbMath1484.91208OpenAlexW3210312518MaRDI QIDQ5031010

Publication date: 18 February 2022

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2132

zbMATH Keywords

bilevel programming multi-object auctions combinatorial exchange payment rules revenue management and market analytics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mixed integer programming (90C11) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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