Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5031023
DOI10.1287/opre.2020.2067zbMath1484.91078OpenAlexW3138190214MaRDI QIDQ5031023
José R. Correa, Marc Schröder, Cristóbal Guzmán, Evdokia Nikolova, Thanasis Lianeas
Publication date: 18 February 2022
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/network-pricing(9498c2eb-a77c-48b2-93d4-983155ba3cf7).html
Games involving graphs (91A43) Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Toll caps in privatized road networks
- A network pricing game for selfish traffic
- Efficiency and complexity of price competition among single-product vendors
- Stackelberg network pricing games
- On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
- Linear tolls suffice: new bounds and algorithms for tolls in single source networks
- The Impact of Worst-Case Deviations in Non-Atomic Network Routing Games
- Computing Optimal Tolls with Arc Restrictions and Heterogeneous Players
- Efficiency of Restricted Tolls in Non-atomic Network Routing Games
- Investment and Market Structure in Industries with Congestion
- Price competition with elastic traffic
- How bad is selfish routing?
- Stronger Bounds on Braess's Paradox and the Maximum Latency of Selfish Routing
- Price Competition in Networked Markets: How Do Monopolies Impact Social Welfare?
- Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse Players
- Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users
- Network pricing problem with unit toll
- Network investment games with Wardrop followers
- Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets
- Bertrand Competition in Networks
This page was built for publication: Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators
