On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games
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Publication:5031044
DOI10.4064/AM2414-5-2021zbMath1483.91027OpenAlexW3217312068MaRDI QIDQ5031044
Publication date: 18 February 2022
Published in: Applicationes Mathematicae (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.4064/am2414-5-2021
desirabilityShapley valueaxiomatizationsolidarity valuecoalitional monotonicitysocial acceptabilityconsensus valueleast square prenucleolusgeneral acceptabilitygeneralized egalitarian Shapley valueleast square familyprocedure valuevalue of TU-game
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