Improving the Chilean College Admissions System
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Publication:5031616
DOI10.1287/opre.2021.2116zbMath1482.90051OpenAlexW3137726299MaRDI QIDQ5031616
Ignacio Rios, Tomás Larroucau, Giorgiogiulio Parra, Roberto Cominetti
Publication date: 16 February 2022
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2116
networksmatchingscollege admissionsstable assignmenteducation systemsflexible quotasnonstrict preferences
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Cites Work
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