Procurement with Cost and Noncost Attributes: Cost-Sharing Mechanisms

DOI10.1287/opre.2020.2060zbMath1484.91110OpenAlexW3129453204MaRDI QIDQ5031628

Shouqiang Wang, Shivam Gupta, Ganesh Janakiraman, Milind W. Dawande

Publication date: 16 February 2022

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.2060

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscost sharingnoncooperativesupply chainsbiddingprocurementmultidimensional mechanism designnoncost attribute

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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