Deals or No Deals: Contract Design for Online Advertising
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Publication:5031634
DOI10.1287/opre.2020.2087zbMath1484.91247OpenAlexW3184587244MaRDI QIDQ5031634
Anthony Kim, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Vahab S. Mirrokni
Publication date: 16 February 2022
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.2087
computational complexityauctionssuboptimal algorithmsrevenue managementbiddingcontract designonline advertisingadvertising and mediafirst-look dealspreferred deals
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Marketing, advertising (90B60) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)
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