The survival of inefficient and efficient norms: Equilibria with and without meta-norms in a repeated norm enforcing game

DOI10.1080/0022250X.2017.1390745zbMath1485.91023OpenAlexW2885388463WikidataQ129408995 ScholiaQ129408995MaRDI QIDQ5033322

Yosuke Kira

Publication date: 22 February 2022

Published in: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.2017.1390745

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesocial dilemmacostly punishmentmeta-norminefficient norm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

This page was built for publication: The survival of inefficient and efficient norms: Equilibria with and without meta-norms in a repeated norm enforcing game