Delegation Using Forward Induction
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Publication:5038395
DOI10.1142/S0219198921500225zbMath1498.91019OpenAlexW3201890676MaRDI QIDQ5038395
Publication date: 30 September 2022
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198921500225
Cooperative games (91A12) Experimental studies (91A90) Principal-agent models (91B43) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
Uses Software
Cites Work
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