Delegation Using Forward Induction

DOI10.1142/S0219198921500225zbMath1498.91019OpenAlexW3201890676MaRDI QIDQ5038395

Swagata Bhattacharjee

Publication date: 30 September 2022

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198921500225

zbMATH Keywords

informationdelegationlab experimentforward induction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Experimental studies (91A90) Principal-agent models (91B43) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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• Promises and Partnership

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