Solving quadratic multi-leader-follower games by smoothing the follower's best response
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Publication:5038441
DOI10.1080/10556788.2020.1828412zbMath1501.91036arXiv1808.07941OpenAlexW3093327601MaRDI QIDQ5038441
Sonja Steffensen, Anna Thünen, Michael Herty
Publication date: 30 September 2022
Published in: Optimization Methods and Software (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.07941
game theoryNash equilibriamulti-leader-follower gamesequilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints
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