The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters
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Publication:5042253
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-50026-9_23OpenAlexW3036568494MaRDI QIDQ5042253
Roman Zorn, Marc Neveling, Jörg Rothe
Publication date: 19 October 2022
Published in: Computer Science – Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50026-9_23
Cites Work
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- Multimode Control Attacks on Elections
- Complexity of Bribery and Control for Uniform Premise-Based Quota Rules Under Various Preference Types
- Elections with Few Voters: Candidate Control Can Be Easy
- Control and Bribery in Voting
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