When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?
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Publication:504391
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.07.001zbMath1368.91116OpenAlexW2488255178MaRDI QIDQ504391
Publication date: 16 January 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.07.001
sd-efficiencysd-no-envypreference richnessprobabilistic serial assignmentrecursive decomposabilitytop-objects divisibility
Related Items (4)
Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach ⋮ Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains ⋮ A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
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