Strategic sharing of a costly network

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.06.006zbMath1368.91117OpenAlexW1494253921MaRDI QIDQ504401

Josep E. Peris, Penélope Hernández, José A. Silva-Reus

Publication date: 16 January 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10045/63410

zbMATH Keywords

corecost allocationsubgame perfect equilibriumminimum cost spanning treetransfer structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (2)

Characterization of monotonic rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems ⋮ A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems

Cites Work

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