Tight Revenue Gaps among Multiunit Mechanisms

DOI10.1137/21M1456364OpenAlexW4307888363MaRDI QIDQ5048292

Pinyan Lu, Shunhua Jiang, Hengjie Zhang, Yaonan Jin

Publication date: 15 November 2022

Published in: SIAM Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.07454

zbMATH Keywords

Myerson auctionanonymous pricingsequential posted pricinganonymous reserveBayesian revenue maximizationrevenue gap

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Integration of real functions of several variables: length, area, volume (26B15) Inequalities for sums, series and integrals (26D15) Inequalities involving derivatives and differential and integral operators (26D10) Integral formulas of real functions of several variables (Stokes, Gauss, Green, etc.) (26B20)

Uses Software

• DLMF

Cites Work

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