Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAA043zbMath1504.91145OpenAlexW3121262926MaRDI QIDQ5049097

Roman Inderst, Marcus M. Opp, Florian Hoffmann

Publication date: 11 November 2022

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa043

zbMATH Keywords

persistencemoral hazardprincipal-agent modelsinformativeness principlecompensation designduration of pay

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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