Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms

DOI10.1093/restud/rdaa052zbMath1504.91184OpenAlexW3135876193MaRDI QIDQ5049108

Alexander Westkamp, Scott Duke Kominers, John William Hatfield

Publication date: 11 November 2022

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa052

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitystrategy-proofnessmatching with contractssubstitutabilitysize monotonicitycumulative offer mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

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