The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAA041zbMath1504.91026OpenAlexW3047513267MaRDI QIDQ5049109

Alexander Wolitzky, Takuo Sugaya

Publication date: 11 November 2022

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa041

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designrevelation principleperfect Bayesian equilibriummultistage gamessequential equilibriuminformation designcodomination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (6)

A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection ⋮ Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations ⋮ On the complexity of dynamic mechanism design ⋮ Mechanism design with informational punishment ⋮ Mechanism design with belief-dependent preferences ⋮ Information design in multistage games

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