(Il)legal Assignments in School Choice

DOI10.1093/restud/rdz041zbMath1504.91183OpenAlexW2968470372WikidataQ127365987 ScholiaQ127365987MaRDI QIDQ5049121

Thayer Morrill, Lars Ehlers

Publication date: 11 November 2022

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz041

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityefficiencyschool choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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