Measuring the Welfare Gains from Optimal Incentive Regulation

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDZ050zbMath1502.91041OpenAlexW2981218003WikidataQ127243657 ScholiaQ127243657MaRDI QIDQ5049131

Jose Miguel Abito

Publication date: 11 November 2022

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz050

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designdynamic panel estimationelectric utilitiesincentive regulationemissions regulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Welfare economics (91B15) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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