Cupid’s Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models
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Publication:5051538
DOI10.1093/restud/rdab090zbMath1502.91040arXiv2106.02371OpenAlexW4200006330MaRDI QIDQ5051538
Alfred Galichon, Bernard Salanié
Publication date: 23 November 2022
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.02371
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