Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAA092zbMath1505.91217OpenAlexW3121487840MaRDI QIDQ5051549

Elisabetta Iossa, Patrick Rey, Yeon-Koo Che

Publication date: 23 November 2022

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa092

zbMATH Keywords

innovationprizescontract rightsprocurement and R\&D

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Related Items (1)

Experimentation in organizations

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