Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_3OpenAlexW2965224234MaRDI QIDQ5053686

Hatem Smaoui, Issofa Moyouwou, Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa

Publication date: 6 December 2022

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Uses Software

• Normaliz
• Convex

Cites Work

• The \(q\)-majority efficiency of positional rules
• Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency
• Normaliz: Algorithms for affine monoids and rational cones
• Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
• Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules
• Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?
• Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
• Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
• The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes
• Computations of volumes and Ehrhart series in four candidates elections
• Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections
• Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes
• Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
• Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives
• Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity

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