The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_4zbMath1502.91023OpenAlexW3048101377MaRDI QIDQ5053687

Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, Mostapha Diss, Abdelmonaim Tlidi

Publication date: 6 December 2022

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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