Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox
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Publication:5053688
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_5zbMath1504.91094OpenAlexW3114079431MaRDI QIDQ5053688
Christian Geist, Martin Strobel, Felix Brandt
Publication date: 6 December 2022
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_5
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