Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_5zbMath1504.91094OpenAlexW3114079431MaRDI QIDQ5053688

Christian Geist, Martin Strobel, Felix Brandt

Publication date: 6 December 2022

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences

Uses Software

• Normaliz
• LattE
• PrefLib
• Convex

Cites Work

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• Handbook of Computational Social Choice

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