Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_7zbMath1504.91086OpenAlexW3114645489MaRDI QIDQ5053691

Boniface Mbih, Raouia Belayadi

Publication date: 6 December 2022

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
• Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
• The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
• The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
• Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations
• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory

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