Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
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Publication:5053694
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_10zbMath1502.91022OpenAlexW3117632395MaRDI QIDQ5053694
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Publication date: 6 December 2022
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_10
Cites Work
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- How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
- Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
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