Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5053695
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_11zbMath1504.91087OpenAlexW3113397312MaRDI QIDQ5053695
Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer, Martin Strobel
Publication date: 6 December 2022
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_11
Related Items (3)
Computations of volumes and Ehrhart series in four candidates elections ⋮ Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections ⋮ Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Correlation, partitioning and the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule
- The computation of generalized Ehrhart series in normaliz
- Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes
- Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
- Voting paradoxes and group coherence. The Condorcet efficiency of voting rules.
- An extension of the Moulin no show paradox for voting correspondences
- On the practical possibility of a 'no show paradox' under the single transferable vote
- Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
- Probability models on rankings
- A dynamical model of political equilibrium
- The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections
- Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving
- Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
- Welfare maximization entices participation
- Software for exact integration of polynomials over polyhedra
- How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
- Computations of volumes and Ehrhart series in four candidates elections
- Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes
- The strong no show paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
- The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles
- Effective lattice point counting in rational convex polytopes
- NON-NULL RANKING MODELS. I
- Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Strategic Abstention based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results and Computer-Generated Impossibilities
- Handbook of Computational Social Choice
- Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
This page was built for publication: Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions
