Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_12zbMath1504.91091OpenAlexW2964287053MaRDI QIDQ5053696

Eric Kamwa, Issofa Moyouwou

Publication date: 6 December 2022

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_12

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules

Uses Software

• Normaliz

Cites Work

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• Polytope Volume Computation
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• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates

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