Combinatorics of Election Scores
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Publication:5053699
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_15zbMath1504.91092OpenAlexW3116450788MaRDI QIDQ5053699
Publication date: 6 December 2022
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_15
Uses Software
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