IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_17zbMath1504.91089OpenAlexW3115290916MaRDI QIDQ5053701

Hatem Smaoui, Abdelhalim El Ouafdi, Issofa Moyouwou

Publication date: 6 December 2022

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_17

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Combinatorial probability (60C05) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

An analysis of random elections with large numbers of voters ⋮ Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences

Uses Software

• Normaliz
• LattE
• Convex

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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