The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-dimensional Revenue Maximization

DOI10.1145/3439722zbMath1505.91128arXiv1808.02458OpenAlexW3139046134MaRDI QIDQ5056403

Yannai A. Gonczarowski, S. Matthew Weinberg

Publication date: 8 December 2022

Published in: Journal of the ACM (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.02458

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsPAC learningalgorithmic mechanism designalgorithmic game theorygeneralization boundssample complexitymulti-dimensional auctionsapproximate revenue maximization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms (68W40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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