Stability Representations of Many-to-One Matching Problems: An Integer Optimization Approach
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Publication:5060805
DOI10.1287/ijoc.2022.1237OpenAlexW4298110042MaRDI QIDQ5060805
Hoda Atef Yekta, Pitchaya Wiratchotisatian, Andrew C. Trapp
Publication date: 11 January 2023
Published in: INFORMS Journal on Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/ijoc.2022.1237
Uses Software
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